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Abstract With the growing popularity of cloud comput-
ing, more and more enterprises and individuals tend to
store their sensitive data on the cloud in order to reduce the
cost of data management. However, new security and pri-
vacy challenges arise when the data stored in the cloud due
to the loss of data control by the data owner. This paper
focuses on the techniques of verifiable data storage and
secure data deduplication. We firstly summarize and clas-
sify the state-of-the-art research on cloud data storage
mechanism. Then, we present some potential research
directions for secure data outsourcing.
Keywords Outsourced storage  Verifiable search  Data
auditing  Secure data deduplication
1 Introduction
Cloud computing, the new term for the long-dreamed
vision of computing as a utility, can offer plenty of benefits
for real-world applications, such as on-demand self-ser-
vice, ubiquitous network access, rapid resource elasticity,
usage-based pricing, outsourcing, etc. One of the funda-
mental advantages of cloud computing is the so-called
outsourcing paradigm. That is, the resource-constrained
users can enjoy high-quality data storage services by out-
sourcing their data to the cloud server.
Despite the tremendous benefits, the outsourcing para-
digm brings some new security challenges. On the one
hand, the cloud server may be not fully trusted, and face
both internal and external security threats, such as soft-
ware/hardware failures, compromised employees, hacker.
A query on data stored on a cloud server may return an
invalid search result. What’s more, the cloud server may be
‘‘semi-honest-but-curious’’ and intentionally execute par-
tial search operations in order to save its computation and
communication overhead. Thus, one significant security
challenge is how to achieve the verifiability of search
results for data stored in the cloud. It means that the client
should efficiently check the validation for the results
returned by the cloud server. Specifically, the following
two security requirements should be meet: (1) correctness:
the result is the original data and has not been modified; (2)
completeness: the result includes all the matched data
satisfying the client’s search request.
On the other hand, with the rapid popularity of cloud
computing, an increasing amount of data is being out-
sourced to the cloud in a exponential growth manner.
Inevitably, this leads to a cost explosion of data storage.
This concerns not only the cost of the hardware and soft-
ware necessary for storing data, but also the rapidly
growing energy consumption in storage systems. As a
promising solution, data deduplication has attracted
increasing attention from both academic and industrial
community. Deduplication can eliminate redundant data by
storing one single copy for duplicate data.
In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of
solutions for verifiability of search results and secure data
deduplication. Specifically, we first review the state of the
art for verifiable data search and secure data deduplication
techniques, and introduce a classification of these tech-
niques. Then, we present current research directions, with
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2,
we briefly present an brief overview of verifiable cloud
storage, including security threats and the corresponding
solutions. A summary of secure data deduplication in cloud
environments is presented in Sect. 3. Finally, we discuss
some future research directions for secure data outsourcing
and conclude this paper in Sect. 4.
2 Verifiable Storage on Outsourced Databases
Database outsourcing has recently attracted considerable
interest. The concept of database outsourcing was first
implicitly introduced by Hacigu¨mu¨s¸ et al. [22]. Their
approach allows the data owner to delegate the database
management to a cloud service provider (CSP) that pro-
vides various database services to users. More specifically,
in the outsourced database (ODB) scenario, the data owner
locally encrypts its own database and then outsources the
encrypted database with additional metadata (i.e., index) to
the CSP, which hosts the database and provides various
database services to the users on behalf of data owner. The
data users can issue query to the CSP and receive the
corresponding results from the CSP.
Despite the tremendous benefits, the outsourced data-
base paradigm inevitably suffers from some new security
challenges. Specifically, due to self-interest and hard-
ware/software failures, cloud servers may execute only a
fraction of the search operations honestly and/or return an
incorrect and/or incomplete query result. What is worst is
that, since users no longer locally possess a copy of the
data, it is difficult to check the integrity of search result.
Therefore, one of the most critical challenges is to effec-
tively audit the integrity of outsourced databases.
2.1 System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, anODB system consists of three entities:
the data owner, the data user, and the cloud service provider.
The data owner outsources its encrypted database to the
cloud service provider, and an (authorized) data user can
issue encrypted queries to the CSP. It is worth nothing that
the CSP should be able to process queries over encrypted
data. In addition, the data user should be able to verify the
search result. Verifiability includes the following two secu-
rity goals: (1) correctness: the result is the original data and
has not been modified; (2) completeness: the result includes
all valid data items satisfying the search condition.
2.2 Threat Model
In an ODB system, the CSP refers to a ‘‘semi-honest-but-
curious’’ server. That is, the CSP may not honestly follow
the proposed protocol but return incomplete search result
and/or execute only partial search operations honestly.
Thus, two types of attacker are considered: (1) external
attacker: a party which wants to obtain knowledge on the
database beyond what the party is authorized to obtain, i.e.,
a revoked user or hacker. (2) internal attacker: a party may
have some knowledge about database (i.e., the CSP). The
goal of the attacker is to return incomplete/incorrect search
results without being detected.
2.3 Integrity Auditing for Outsourced Databases
Several researchers have investigated techniques for veri-
fiable database outsourcing in the past decade. The existing
approaches can be categorized into two types according to
the verification approach adotped.
2.3.1 Authenticated Data Structure-Based Integrity
Verification
The first approach is based on authenticated data structures
(e.g., Merkle hash tree [36]) [8, 16, 17, 27, 34, 38, 47].
Devanbu et al. [17] firstly investigated the problem of
integrity auditing on outsourced databases. Their solution
does not require the results pre-computation (signature) of
all the possible queries nor deliver the whole database to
the user. The basic idea is that an index based on the
Merkle hash tree (MHT) is generated, and then, the search
result can be verified by re-computing the signature of the
root of the MHT. Note that the leaf nodes of a MHT should
be ordered. Such requirement makes frequent data updates
costly. More importantly, the size of verification object
(VO) is linear in the cardinality of the query result and
logarithmic in the scale of the database. Pang et al. [47]
proposed the notion of verifiable B-trees (VB-tree), where
each internal node is assigned with a signed hash value
derived from all the data items in the subtree rooted at the
current node. In processing a query, the cloud server first
locates the smallest subtree covering all the query results. It
then computes the VO as the hash values for all the data
items in the subtree that are not included in the result.
Trivially, the size of VO is independent of the database
size. Nuckolls [45] presented a flexible verification struc-
ture called hybrid authentication tree (HAT) by incorpo-
rating one-way accumulator. The proposed solution
enables a consolidated proof to reduce the size of the VO.
Later, Li et al. [27] introduced a novel notion of Embedded
Merkle B-tree (EMB-tree). The basic idea is to embed a
Bþ-tree into an MHT. To verify the completeness of a
range query, the VO includes all the sibling hash out of
scope of two immediately neighboring records in the
ordered sequence.
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2.3.2 Signature Chaining-Based Integrity Verification
The second approach is based on the signature chaining
technique [40, 41, 43, 46]. Mykletun et al. [40] investigated
the notion of signature aggregation which allows one to
combine multiple signatures into a single one, thereby
reducing verification overhead for search results. However,
their mechanism ensures correctness for search results and
does not provide completeness guarantee. Later, Nar-
asimha et al. [43] addressed completeness by integrating
signature aggregation and chaining techniques. Specifi-
cally, the client generates a signature for each data item
containing all the immediate predecessors in different
dimensions. Then, given a range query, their technique
requires two boundary data items to be returned along with
the target data items. The completeness of the search result
can be verified using the chained signature. Pang et al.
[46, 48] give two solutions to the completeness problem for
static and dynamic outsourced database, respectively. In
their solutions, all data items are assumed to be ordered
with respect to certain searchable attributes, and the data
owner creates a signature for each item that consists of
information about the two neighboring items in the ordered
sequence. Note that there is no need for additional
boundary data items. Nevertheless, the case when non-
continuous regions are queried is intractable. Recently,
Yuan and Yu [59] presented a new verifiable aggregation
query scheme for outsourced databases. Specifically, each
data item is assigned an authentication tag based on a
polynomial, which can be used to check the integrity of
query result for certain aggregation queries.
Notice that none of the existing solutions ensure the
completeness of result when the cloud server intentionally
returns an empty result. Wang et al. [55] proposed a novel
verifiable outsourced database scheme based on Bloom
filters. In their construction, the data user can check the
integrity of the search result even if the CSP intentionally
returns an empty set. Their technique allows the data user
to ensure the correctness of search result by checking
whether the search request belongs to the Bloom filters.
Remark 1 As a complementary solution, a probabilistic
integrity verification methods have been proposed by Xie
at al. [57] and Sion [50]. The main idea of such methods is
that the data owner inserts some faked data items in the
database beforehand. The disadvantages of such methods
are twofold: On the one hand, the fake data items must be
shared by all authorized data users and this makes the
methods vulnerable to compromise attacks. On the other
hand, the methods requires the cloud server to return all
attributes of the data items and thus the method cannot
support some common database operations such as
projection.
Remark 2 Another concern about data integrity auditing
is related storage integrity for outsourced data. Storage
integrity refers to the ability to check whether the out-
sourced data are lost or corrupted without retrieving it. The
pioneer works include the Provable Data Possession (PDP)
protocol [3] and the Proof of Retrievability (POR) protocol
[26]. Since the definition of such protocols, several
researchers have investigated the problem of remote data
auditing.
It should be pointed out that there are some differences
between storage and query integrity for outsourced data.
First, in the storage integrity setting, the user must have
beforehand knowledge about the database (e.g., the hash
value of data blocks). By contrast, in the query integrity
setting, the user is not required to have knowledge about
the database. Furthermore, storage integrity only focuses
on query correctness whereas query integrity must ensure
both the correctness and completeness of the query.
Fig. 1 Architecture of an
outsourced database system
model
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2.4 Verifiable Databases with Updates
Benabbas et al. [7] proposed a useful cryptographic prim-
itive for verifiable databases with efficient updates (VDB).
That is, a resource-constrained client may outsource a
large-scale database to a cloud server and later efficiently
performs verification of query results in a dynamic data-
base scenario. If a dishonest cloud server tampers with any
data item in the database, the misbehavior will be detected
with an overwhelming probability (once the tampered data
item is queried). In addition, the cost of query processing
and query result verification should be independent of the
size of the database.
For the case of static databases, the above problem can
be addressed by trivially adopting message authentication
or digital signature technique. Namely, the client signs
each data item before uploading it to the cloud server, and
the cloud server is required to return the requested data
item together with its valid signature. Nevertheless, this
solution cannot work well when the database is updated.
The main challenge is related to how to revoke the valid
signatures given to the cloud server for the previous values
of the modified data item. A naive solution is that the client
locally keeps track of every change. However, such a
solution negates the advantages of database outsourcing.
Although existing techniques such as accumulators
[10, 11, 44], and authentication data structures
[35, 42, 49, 52] that can be adopted to address such
problem, these solutions either rely on nonconstant size
assumptions (e.g., the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assump-
tions) or require expensive operations such as the genera-
tion of primes and re-shuffling procedures.
Benabbas et al. [7] proposed the first efficient VDB
scheme under the subgroup membership assumption in
composite order bilinear groups. The main idea is to apply
a verifiable polynomial evaluation scheme constructed with
algebraic pseudo-random functions. However, their solu-
tion can only achieve private verifiability. In other words,
only the data owner can perform verification of search
results. As the data users have limited resources, it is
critical that any data user verify the validity of data updated
by the server. Here, we introduce the formal definition of
VDB [7]. In the definition, the term ‘‘client’’ refers to the
notion of ‘‘data owner’’ that we use in our discussion
throughout the paper.
Definition 1 A verifiable database
scheme VDB ¼ ðSetup;Query;Verify;UpdateÞ consists
of four algorithms defined as follows.
• Setupð1k;DBÞ ! ðS;PK;SKÞ: On input the security
parameter k and a database DB, the setup algorithm is
run by the client to generate a database encoding S that
is given to the server, a public key PK that is distributed
to all users, and a secret key SK that is secretly stored at
the client.
• QueryðPK;S; xÞ ! r: The query algorithm takes as
input an index x and returns a pair r ¼ ðv; pÞ, which is
run by the server.
• VerifyðPK=SK; x; rÞ ! v: The public verification algo-
rithm outputs a value v if r is correct with respect to x,
and an special symbol ? otherwise.
• UpdateðSK; x; v0xÞ ! PK0: In the update algorithm, the
client firstly generates a token t0x with its own secret key
SK and then sends the pair ðt0x; v0xÞ to the server. Then,
the server uses v0x to update the database record of index
x, and outputs the updated public key PK0 according to
t0x.
2.4.1 Vector Commitment-Based VDB Framework
Catalano and Fiore [12] formalized a powerful crypto-
graphic primitive named vector commitment. Informally
speaking, the notion of vector commitment allows one to
commit to an vector ðm1; . . .;mqÞ in such a way that the
committer can later open the commitment at specific
positions. Also, nobody should be able to open a com-
mitment to two different values at the same position (this is
called position binding). Besides, the vector commitment
should be concise, i.e., the size of the commitment string
and the opening are both independent of the vector com-
mitment q. Additionally, the vector commitment should be
updatable for constructing a VDB scheme. That is, it is
required that the committer is able to update the original
commitment value by changing a specific component of the
vector and the opening would still be valid for the updated
commitment. The detailed formal definition of vector
commitment can be found in [12].
Catalano and Fiore [12] constructed a novel VDB
scheme from the vector commitment. The proposed con-
struction does not only rely on the standard constant-size
cryptographic assumption (Computational Diffie-Hellman),
but also satisfies the property of public verifiability. For-
mally, the framework consists of the following algorithms:
• Setupð1k;DBÞ ! ðS;PK;SK: Let the database be
DB ¼ ði; viÞ for 1 i q. Run the key generation and
committing algorithms of vector commitment to obtain
the public parameters PP VC:KeyGenð1k; qÞ and
the initial commitment and auxiliary information
ðC; auxÞ  VC:ComPPðv1;    ; vqÞ, respectively. It
outputs the database encoding S ¼ ðPP; aux;DBÞ, the
system public key PK ¼ ðPP;CÞ and the client’s secret
key SK ¼?.
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• QueryðPK;S; xÞ ! r: On input an index x, the server
firstly runs the opening algorithm to compute px  
VC:OpenPPðvx; x; auxÞ and then returns r ¼ ðvx; pxÞ.
• VerifyðPK; x; rÞ ! vx: Parse the proofs r as ðvx; pxÞ. If
VC:VerPPðC; x; vx; pxÞ ¼ 1, then return vx, and an
special symbol ? otherwise.
• UpdateðSK; x; v0xÞ: To update the record of index x, the
client firstly retrieves the current record vx from the
server. That is, the client obtains r QueryðPK;S; xÞ
from the server and checks that VerifyðPK; x; rÞ ¼
vx 6¼?. Then the client computes ðC0;UÞ  VC:
UpdatePPðC; vx; x; v0xÞ and outputs PK0 ¼ ðPP;C0Þ and
t0x ¼ ðPK0; v0x;UÞ. Finally, the server uses v0x to update
the database record of index x, PK0 to update the public
key, and U to update the auxiliary information.
2.4.2 Weaknesses of Catalano–Fiore’s VDB Scheme
Chen et al. [14] described two types of attack for the
Catalano–Fiore’s VDB scheme, namely the Forward
Automatic Update (FAU) attack and the Backward Sub-
stitution Update (BSU) attack. We revisit them in what
follows:
2.4.2.1 Forward Automatic Update (FAU) Attack In the
Catalano–Fiore’s VDB scheme [12], anyone (include a
malicious cloud server) can update the data in the same
manner of the data owner. To be specific, an adversary first
retrieves a record vx. Then, the adversary generates the new
public key PK 0 and the token t0 based on a new data record
value v0 (without involving any knowledge of secret key).
Finally, the cloud server updates the corresponding data
record as well as the public key. Interestingly, any query
issued to the cloud server can be replied to with a valid
proof based on the forward updated public key PK 0. As a
consequence, the above misbehavior would not be detec-
ted. The result is that an auditor cannot determine with
certainty that the cloud server has been dishonest.
2.4.2.2 Backward Substitution Update (BSU) Attack The
so-called BSU attack means that anyone can substitute the
current public key with the previous one. As noted above,
anyone is allowed to update the public key. Therefore, if
the client does not locally store a copy of the public key; it
is difficult for him to distinguish the past public key from
the latest one. On the other hand, even if the client has
stored the latest public key, it is still to be difficult for the
client to prove that the locally stored public key is the latest
one.
Remark 3 The main reason of the above attacks is that the
client’s secret key is not be involved in the update of the
public key. Note that it is useless to append the signature
on the public key. If the cloud server generates the signa-
ture, it has the ability to compute the signature on any
public key. On the other hand, if the signature is computed
by the client, the original question arises again: How to
efficiently revoke the previous (valid) signature?
2.4.3 VDB Framework from Commitment Binding
To achieve public verifiability and protect against the FAU/
BSU attacks simultaneously, Chen et al. [14] proposed a
novel VDB framework for vector commitment based on
the idea of commitment binding (see Fig. 2). That is, the
client uses the secret key to generate a signature on some
binding information. This information consists of the latest
public key, the commitment on the current database, and a
global counter. Assume that the client’s signature on the
binding information is HT ¼ SignskðCT1;CðTÞ; TÞ, then we
obtain the current public key as CT ¼ HTCðTÞ. Thus, this
method recursively binds the commitment CT to a 3-tuple
ðCT1;CðTÞ; TÞ. As a consequence, an adversary (i.e., the
cloud server) cannot update the database and public key
without the client’s secret key.
Chen et al. [15] also introduced the notion of verifiable
database with incremental updates (Inc-VDB), i.e., the
client can efficiently update the ciphertext with the previ-
ous one, rather than from scratch. It is useful for large
database settings, especially when there are frequent slight
modifications. Note that in traditional encryption schemes
the ciphertext needs to be totally recomputed even if only
one single bit is changed in plaintext , resulting in very
high overhead for the resources-constrained clients. To
address this challenge, the Inc-VDB framework incorpo-
rates vector commitment and encrypt-then-incremental
MAC mode of encryption [9]. The main trick is that the
updated ciphertext v0x is generated in an incremental man-
ner as follows: we define v0x ¼ ðvx;PxÞ, where Px ¼
ðp1; p2; . . .; pkÞ denotes the location of bit positions with
different values between the original and updated plaintext
message. Given v0 ¼ ðvx;PxÞ, the client first decrypts vx to
Fig. 2 Commitment binding technique
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obtain mx and then performs the bit flipping operation on
the positions of Px to obtain the final plaintext m
0
x.
It worth noting that the existing VDB schemes cannot
fully support data update operations. Specifically, the
existing solutions can only support data replacement and
deletion operations while they are not applicable of the
insertion operation. The main reason is that the number of
index of the database must be fixed in advance and published
as the system parameters in both schemes. On the other hand,
when the client performs an insertion/deletion operation on
an outsourced database, the number of the index will be
increased/ decreased by 1. Therefore, it seems to be a para-
dox to design a VDB scheme that supports all update oper-
ations using the existing solutions, such as delegating high-
degree polynomial function and vector commitment.
Miao et al. [37] utilized the idea of hierarchical (vector)
commitment to address the above dilemma. The hierarchical
commitment consists of multiple levels, and the maximum
number of data items for each level is the dimension q of
vector in a vector commitment.When a level is a full (i.e., the
number of data items in this level is q), a new inserted data
record will be located in a new level.
3 Secure Cloud Data Deduplication Technique
According to the latest analysis by IDC [54], the volume of
data we create and copy annually is doubling in size every
2 years, and will reach 44 trillion gigabytes in 2020. With
the dramatic increase in data volumes, how to efficiently
store the ever-increasing data becomes a critical challenge
for cloud servers. Data deduplication, as a specialized data
compression technique, has been adopted widely to save
storage costs by only storing a single copy of repeating data
and replacing with links to that copy. Data deduplication
can achieve more than 50 % storage reduction [2] and has
been deployed by many cloud storage providers, such as
Dropbox, Google Drive, Bitcasa and Mozy.
However, conventional encryption is incompatible with
deduplication. Specifically, encrypting the same data with
different encryption keys results into distinct ciphertexts
corresponding to the same source data. Thus, it makes
cross-user deduplication impossible.
To fill the above gap, convergent encryption (CE) [19],
an elegant cryptographic primitive, is proposed. Essentially
speaking, CE is a deterministic symmetric encryption
scheme and its encryption key is derived from the cryp-
tographic hash value of the file content. Then, each iden-
tical data item generates the same ciphertext, which
achieves deduplication and encryption simultaneously.
Bellare et al. [6] defined a new cryptographic primitive
called message-locked encryption (MLE), which can be
viewed as a generalization of CE. Furthermore, to enhance
performance of deduplication, a randomized convergent
encryption (RCE) scheme has been proposed. It is char-
acterized by the efficiency of the relevant operations, i.e.,
key generation, message encryption, and tag production.
However, RCE is vulnerable to what is called duplicate
faking attack. Specifically, an honest user cannot retrieve
his original message because it can be undetectably
replaced by a fake one. To tackle this problem, an inter-
active version of RCE, called interactive randomized
convergent encryption (IRCE) [4], has been proposed. In
IRCE, an honest user can check tag consistency by inter-
acting with the server and thus verify that the original
ciphertext is stored. If an adversary may upload a modified
ciphertext, this ciphertext will be inconsistent with respect
to the corresponding file tag. Such a mismatch allows one
to detect that the ciphertext is incorrect.
3.1 Deduplication Classification
According to the granularity and architecture, deduplica-
tion can be categorized into different types. With respect to
granularity, there are two deduplication strategies. (1) File-
level deduplication: The data redundancy is exploited at the
file level. Only one copy of the identical data file is saved
and subsequent copies are replaced with a link that points
to the original file. (2) Block-level deduplication: each file
is divided into multiple blocks (or segments, chunks) and
the data redundancy is exploited at the block level. Note
that the block size can be either fixed or variable in prac-
tice. Despite achieving higher deduplication ratio, block-
level deduplication inevitably requires more metadata and
needs longer processing times.
With respect to the architecture, there are two dedupli-
cation strategies. (1) Server-side deduplication (known as
target-based deduplication): All clients upload their data to
the CSP and are unaware of deduplication that might occur.
TheCSP is responsible for deleting the duplicate copies. This
strategy reduces storage costs, but does not save bandwidth
costs. (2) Client-side deduplication (known as source-based
deduplication): The client first sends a tag of the data (e.g., a
hash value) to the CSP to check whether the data to be
uploaded are already in the cloud. If yes, the data does not
need to be uploaded. This strategy can save both bandwidth
and storage costs, but is prone to side channel attacks since a
client can learn if another client already uploaded a givenfile.
The details will be discussed later.
3.2 Security Challenges and Solutions
Without loss of generality, we focus on client-side, cross-
user deduplication. Cross-user deduplication means that
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the deduplication operations are performed across all data
uploaded by all users. Such method increases the effec-
tiveness of deduplication, as deduplication is executed
not only when a single user repeatedly uploads the same
data but also when different users upload the same data.
Despite its benefits in reducing storage and communi-
cation costs, client-side cross-user deduplication suffers
from several privacy threats [5, 24, 58].
3.2.1 Brute-Force Attack
As discuss above, CE protocols can be used to ensure data
privacy in deduplication. However, it is vulnerable to
brute-force attacks. That is, suppose the target message is
drawn from a finite space of size n S ¼ fM1; . . .;Mng.
Then, any attacker can generate the convergent key of each
message and compute the corresponding ciphertext as in
off-line encryption. If one computed ciphertext is equal to
the target ciphertext, the target message is inferred. The
basic reason is that CE is a deterministic symmetric
encryption scheme, and the key space is limited. It implies
that no MLE (CE) scheme can achieve traditional semantic
security [21]. The ideal security for MLE scheme, PRV$-
CDA [6], refers to an encryption scheme that can achieve
semantic security when the messages are unpre-
dictable (i.e., have high min-entropy).
Bellare et al. [5] proposed a novel secure deduplication
system resisting brute-force attacks, called DupLESS,
which can transform the predictable message into an
unpredictable one with the help of an additional key server.
More specifically, DupLESS introduces an additional key
server that generates the convergent key based on two
inputs: the hash of message and a system-wide key. The
client obtains the convergent key by interactively running
an oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) with the key
server. As long as the key server is secure, the convergent
key is derived from a random large key space. It implies
that DupLESS can ensure confidentiality for the pre-
dictable message. Furthermore, to prevent online brute-
force attacks by compromised client, a per-client rate-
limiting strategy is applied to limit the total number of
queries a client can make during each epoch. It implies that
DupLESS can achieve the same security of MLE at worst
even the key server is compromised. Duan [20] proposed a
distributed version of DupLESS, where the client must
interact with the threshold of other clients to generate the
convergent key before uploading a file. Moreover, a trusted
dealer should be included to distribute key shares for each
client. We argue that the trusted dealer has similar role of
the key server in DupLESS. Thus, this scheme still suffers
from online brute-force attacks in the case in which the
dealer is comprised.
Recently, Liu et al. [33] proposed a secure single-server
cross-user deduplication scheme that resists brute-force
attacks. The client who wants to upload a given file runs a
password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol
with the CSP to obtain the encryption key from the original
client who had previously uploaded the identical file.
Suppose the client wants to upload a file, the client first
sends a short hash of the uploading file as ‘‘password.’’
Upon receiving the uploading request, the CSP firstly
identifies all the candidate clients with the same short hash
value and asks the client to engage in a Same-Input-PAKE
protocol with each candidate client. Note that as the Same-
Input-PAKE protocol is run between the CSP and the cli-
ent, the client does not need direct communications among
themselves. To protect against brute-force attacks, two
additional mechanisms are introduced. First, it uses the
randomized threshold strategy [24] to assign a random
threshold for each file and perform client-side deduplica-
tion once the number of the file is higher than the threshold
value, so that the attacker cannot determine whether the file
being uploaded already exists at the CSP. Second, a per-file
rate-limiting strategy is used to protect against online
brute-force attacks. Compared with the per-client rate-
limiting strategy in DupLESS, the proposed strategy
enhances security of deduplication and reduces communi-
cation overhead (i.e., the run time of PAKE).
3.2.2 Duplicate Faking Attacks
In a duplicate faking attack, an honest user might be unable
to retrieve his original file, since it can be replaced by a
fake one and the replacement cannot be detected. That is,
suppose that users Alice and Bob possess two different files
Fa and Fb, respectively. The malicious user Alice may
upload a modified ciphertext Ca ¼ ðEðHðFbÞ;FaÞÞ and the
corresponding tag Ta ¼ HðEðHðFbÞ;FbÞÞ into the CSP.
Later, when the honest user Bob uploads the ciphertext
Cb ¼ ðEðHðFbÞ;FbÞÞ and its tag Tb ¼ HðEðHðFbÞ;FbÞÞ,
the CSP wrongly determines that the plaintexts of Cb and
Ca are identical, and thus deletes Cb. As a result, Bob
cannot retrieve his original plaintext. The main reason is
that the CSP cannot check tag consistency [6] without
knowing the hash value of the file.
To address this drawback, a variant of MLE called
randomized convergent encryption (RCE) has been intro-
duced [6]. RCE introduces a checking mechanism, called
guarded decryption, by which the client can check the
integrity of the returned ciphertext. The RCE scheme is
described as follows: the client first picks at random a key
L and then computes ciphertext C1 ¼ EðL;FÞ and
C2 ¼ L K, where K is the hash value of file H(F). The
tag is generated from the file by a double hash, i.e.,
T ¼ HðKÞ. Upon receiving the ciphertexts C1 and C2, the
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tag T, the client can obtain the random key L ¼ C2  K
using the hash of file, and the plaintext F by decrypting C1
with L. Then, the client regenerates a tag T 0 ¼ HðHðFÞÞ
and checks whether T 0 is equal to T. Furthermore, an
interactive version of RCE, called interactive randomized
convergent encryption (IRCE), has been proposed [4], by
which a client can check the consistency of a file tag by
interacting with the CSP. In this way, the client can ensure
that the original ciphertext is stored by the CSP. However,
the cloud server cannot check consistency between the tag
and the ciphertext, since it has no access to the original
plaintext. Thus, the CSP cannot determine which user is
dishonest. From the point of view of practical applications,
this is a major drawback. Preferably, it should be possible
not only to identify which users are malicious, but also to
trace these users—i.e., identify all ciphertexts uploaded by
these. This is nontrivial, if a CSP or the data owners allow
users to remain anonymous or appear under different
identities. Wang et al. [56] designed a novel deduplication
scheme, called TrDup, which makes it possible to trace
malicious users. Specifically, each user generates a kind of
anonymous signature for the uploaded file—a variant of the
traceable signature scheme is used. Once a duplicate faking
attack is detected, the tracing agent can determine the
identity of the malicious user without revealing identities
of other users or linking their files in the cloud.
3.2.3 Hash Manipulation Attack
Harnik et al. [24] pointed out that client-side deduplication
is vulnerable to side channel attacks. That is, whenever
receiving an upload request, the CSP will tell whether the
uploading file has already been stored. However, an
attacker may abuse the information to launch a brute-force
attack by trying all possible variants of the same file.
Mulazzani et al. [39] show how to carry out this attack
against mainstream cloud storage provider (i.e., Dropbox).
Furthermore, Halevi et al. [23] argued that an attacker can
obtain the ownership of a file that he actually does not own
by providing the hash of file. The main reason is that the
CSP determines whether a client owns a specific file using
a small piece of information about the file (i.e., hash value).
Thus, anyone who possess the short hash value for a
specific file can be allowed to access the entire content of
file.
To protect against such attack, Halevi et al. [23] intro-
duced the concept of proof of ownership (PoW), which can
be used to ensure data privacy and confidentiality in case of
client-side deduplication. Namely, a user can efficiently
prove to the cloud storage server that he indeed owns a file
without uploading it. Three concrete PoW constructions
have been presented—all based on a Merkle hash tree
(MHT) built from the content of a data file.
Specifically, a challenge/response protocol is run
between server and client. Each data file is denoted as a
MHT (the leaf nodes constitute the data file), and the server
first asks for a random subset of the MHT leaf nodes from
the client. If the client does not possess the whole file, it
cannot generate a valid proof with overwhelming proba-
bility. Using a PoW, the cheating attacks can be prevented.
That is, a user that only knows only the hash signature of a
file cannot convince the cloud server that he owns that file.
Di Pietro and Sorniotti [18] proposed an efficient PoW
scheme, in which each challenge is a seed for a pseudo-
random generator and the response is the set of values in
the file at bit positions derived by the generator from the
seed. Every time a file is uploaded to the server, the latter
computes a set of challenges for that file and stores them
for a later check. Alı´s et al. [1] proposed a PoW
scheme based on a Bloom filter, which is efficient at both
the server and the client side.
3.3 Deduplication Efficiency
Recent approaches to secure deduplication have focused on
security enhancements and efficiency. [2, 13, 25, 28–32,
51, 53, 60, 61]. Among those works, most are focused on
security enhancement and efficiency improvement. Stanek
et al. [51] proposed a novel deduplication encryption
scheme that can provide different security levels for data
files according their popularity that refers to how fre-
quently the file is shared among users. Their approach can
achieve a fine-grained trade-off between the storage effi-
ciency and data security for the outsourced data. Arm-
knecht et al. [2] designed a novel verifiable deduplication
storage system, namely ClearBox, which ensures that the
client can check the deduplication pattern of his own
encrypted data, i.e., whether his files are deduplicated or
not. Li et al. [31] and Hur et al. [25] have investigated the
key update and user revocation problems, respectively.
Li et al. [28] have proposed DeKey [29], an efficient and
reliable key management scheme for block-level dedupli-
cation. In DeKey, each client distributes the convergent
key shares across multiple servers based on the ramp secret
sharing scheme. Zhou et al. [61] proposed a more fine-
grained key management scheme called SecDup, which
mitigates the key generation overhead by exploiting hybrid
deduplication policies. Li et al. [30] proposed a fine-
grained deduplication mechanism based on user privileges.
A client can perform a duplication check only for the files
marked with matching privileges. Li et al. [28] designed a
distributed reliable deduplication scheme, which can
achieve data reliability and secure deduplication simulta-
neously by dispersing the data shares across multiple cloud
servers. Chen et al. [13] proposed a novel storage-efficient
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deduplication scheme, called block-level message-locked
encryption (BL-MLE), in which the block keys are
encapsulated into the block tag to reduce metadata storage
space.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
Secure data outsourcing is an important research topic in
cloud computing. Even though secure data outsourcing has
been widely investigated, more research work is needed.
Relevant research directions include the following:
• Publicly Verifiable ODB The existing ODB schemes
just support private verifiability. That is, as only the
data owner can check the validity of his own data
because only the data owner knows the secret key. The
data owner must be involved in every verification1.
Thus, how to design a publicly verifiable ODB
scheme is an interesting problem.
• Privacy-preserving VDB The traditional VDB schemes
do not consider the privacy of users. Specifically,
information about update patterns (i.e., the updated data
items and the update frequency) is leaked to the CSP. A
valuable research direction is how to construct a
construct privacy-preserving VDB scheme.
• User-Revokable deduplication Although the traceabil-
ity of malicious users can be achieved in secure data
deduplication, the problem of user revocation still
needs to be addressed in multi-user scenarios. Thus,
one valuable research topic is the development of data
deduplication mechanism supporting user revocation.
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